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LITIGATION’S ROLE IN THE PATH OF U.S. 
FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION:  
IMPLICATIONS OF AEP V. CONNECTICUT 
Hari M. Osofsky* 
This symposium analyzes the role of litigation in climate change 
regulation, with a particular focus on the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2011 
decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).1  This 
Essay adds to that conversation by exploring the significance of AEP for 
U.S. federal legal approaches to regulating climate change. 
The United States has yet to pass comprehensive climate change 
legislation, and it looks unlikely to do so in the near future.  In fact, the 
recent legislative crisis over raising the debt limit is resulting in budget 
cuts for the federal agencies that focus on environmental protection and 
energy.2  However, despite congressional inaction, the United States has 
an emerging federal-level climate change regulatory regime, due in large 
part to the Supreme Court’s decisions on climate change. 
The Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA held that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has the authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act and that the EPA had 
abused its discretion in failing to exercise that authority without 
adequate justification.3  Under the Obama administration, the EPA relies 
on Massachusetts to regulate emissions from motor vehicles and power 
plants in collaboration with other agencies, major corporate emitters, and 
leader states.4  In June 2011, the Supreme Court decided another case 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate Director of Law, 
Geography & Environment, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment & the 
Life Sciences; Affiliated Faculty, Geography and Conservation Biology.  This piece, though 
it has a different focus, is in part an edited version of Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. 
Connecticut’s Implications for the Future of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
101 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html.  I appreciate the excellent 
work of Associate Dean JoEllen Lind in organizing the symposium, and the helpful 
editorial assistance of Paul Ghem, Dustin Klein, Katie Patrick, Jonathan Sichtermann, and 
Anne Zygadlo of the Valparaiso University Law Review.  As always, I thank Josh, Oz, and 
Scarlet Gitelson for their love, support, and patience. 
1 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).   
2 See Elana Schor, Debt Deal Set to Crater Energy, Enviro Spending for Years to Come, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/28/28greenwire-debt-
deal-set-to-crater-energy-enviro-spending-66673.html?pagewanted=all. 
3 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
4 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 85, 86, and 600 and 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533, 536, 537, and 538); see also Remarks on 
Fuel Efficiency Standards, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00377 (May 19, 2009), available at  
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900377.pdf. 
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involving climate change and, in the process, reinforced the country’s 
current regulatory path.  In AEP, the Supreme Court closed the door to 
federal common law nuisance actions involving climate change, but did 
so in a manner that gives additional protection to the federal regulatory 
approach under Massachusetts.5 
This Essay begins in Section I with an analysis of the complex 
barriers to effective U.S. action on climate change. Then, Section II 
explains the role that the Supreme Court decisions in Massachusetts and 
AEP play in shaping federal regulatory approaches.  The Essay 
concludes in Section III by considering the decisions’ impact in the 
broader context of climate change litigation taking place in the lower 
courts within the United States and in domestic and international 
tribunals around the world.  It argues that litigation is serving a 
constructive role in assessing regulatory decisions at multiple levels, but 
that critical justice problems will remain unless concerned citizens and 
climate change victims have adequate mechanisms for addressing 
emissions and impacts. 
I.  COMPLEXITY OF U.S. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change poses a multidimensional regulatory problem 
because addressing it involves many levels of government and a wide 
range of governmental and nongovernmental actors.  This problem 
cannot be solved at just one level of government or through one type of 
law.6  Moreover, this governance complexity involves:  (1) scientific, 
technical, and legal uncertainty; (2) simultaneously overlapping and 
fragmented legal regimes; (3) difficulties of balancing inclusion and 
efficiency; and (4) inequality and resulting injustice.7  A myriad of 
simultaneous strategies must be employed to address both mitigation 
and adaptation to impacts fairly and effectively. 
The United States’ struggles to regulate climate change at a federal 
level reflect these complexities.  While extremely strong scientific 
consensus exists, internationally and in the United States, that 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change, greater 
                                                 
5 See 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
6 For an in depth analysis of these issues, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change  Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 267–83 (2011) 
[hereinafter Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change]; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate 
Change “International”?  Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 631–49 
(2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?]. 
7 For an in depth analysis of each of these aspects of governance complexity in the 
context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, see Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional 
Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV 1077 (2011). 
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uncertainty persists (and will continue to do so due to the nature of the 
science) about whether particular emissions result in some types of 
specific harms like Hurricane Katrina or 2011’s severe snowstorms, heat, 
and flooding; other harms, like sea level rise, are more certain.8  These 
uncertainties, together with recent scandals over climate change science 
and a handful of vocal climate change skeptics reaching the public 
through blogging, conservative programming, and politicians, have 
resulted in the U.S. public becoming more skeptical of climate change 
science.9  This public skepticism, especially paired with political 
divisions between the Senate and the House, and between Congress and 
the Executive Branch following the 2010 midterm elections, limits the 
viability of new climate change legislation.  As a result, long-standing 
environmental statutes, recent “clean energy” and economic recovery 
legislation, and executive orders provide the primary pathways for 
federal efforts to address climate change mitigation.10  Federal 
adaptation policy is at an even more nascent stage, guided by an 
interagency task force created through executive order by President 
Obama in October 2009.11 
The difficulties of framing legal mechanisms to respond to complex 
and evolving science, amid partisan battles, are exacerbated by the 
substantive breadth of climate change.  Federal environmental, energy, 
mining, tax, transportation, and economic recovery legislation and 
regulation represent just some of the areas of law that impact U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions and the need to participate in adaptation 
planning.  Moreover, these regimes function largely separately and are 
assigned to different agencies.  The Obama administration’s decision to 
bring together fuel efficiency and tailpipe emissions standards, for 
                                                 
8 See Patrick J. Bartlein, Professor, Dep’t of Geography, Univ. of Or., Remarks at 
Seminar on Reading the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007) (author’s 
notes) (on file with author); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S. 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM:  METHODS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 5 (2007), 
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309108268.  For a discussion of this 
scale-uncertainty problem, see Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 6, at 
597–98 n.43 and accompanying text. 
9 See Yale Project on Climate Change Communication & George Mason University 
Center for Climate Change Communication, Climate Change in the American Mind: 
Americans’ Global Warming Beliefs and Attitudes in May 2011, 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateBeliefsMay2011.pdf. 
10 See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6, at 243–58 (providing 
a summary of the Obama administration’s efforts on climate change). 
11 See Council on Envtl. Quality, Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2011). 
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example, represents a rare moment of merging regulatory standards 
from different legal regimes.12 
This simultaneous overlap and fragmentation among the federal 
regimes creates difficult questions about who should be included in 
interagency collaboration.  Both mitigation and adaptation interact with 
a wide range of U.S. federal governmental entities.  For instance, the 
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force has three co-
chairing entities—the Council on Environmental Quality, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy—as well as representatives from six additional 
agencies on its steering committee, and members from seven entities 
within the Executive Office of the President, twelve departments, and 
five independent agencies.13  Having a large number of key entities 
involved helps to prevent parallel, uncoordinated action, but can make 
decision-making more cumbersome.  Moreover, these federal-level 
collaborations also take place in the broader context of international, 
regional, state, and local efforts, but often without meaningful 
coordination among them.14 
Justice concerns run through all of these governance complexities.  
While a primary focus of climate justice is often at a global level, where 
the benefits and burdens of climate change are distributed unequally, 
these concerns arise at a national level as well.  Existing law helps ensure 
the profitability of major corporate emitters—such as in the royalty 
scheme that supports deepwater drilling—and those emitters in turn 
contribute to campaigns and fund lobbyists in Washington.15  Low-
income communities, communities of color, and indigenous peoples 
often bear the brunt of those industries’ externalities; they also have less 
capacity to adapt to climate change or to compete for the resources that 
assist transition to cleaner, cheaper energy.  Although the Obama 
administration has made a significant commitment to environmental 
                                                 
12 See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6. 
13 WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE:  RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A 
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, app. A (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-
Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf. 
14 See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6. 
15 See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (2006); Melanie Mason, Drilling Support, Donations Big for Texas 
Congressional Delegation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 2010, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20100603-Drilling-support-
donations-big-for-7856.ece. 
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justice concerns, vulnerable populations find it harder to navigate the 
above-described complexities of climate change law and policy.16 
II.  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN SHAPING THE FEDERAL 
REGULATORY PATH 
The U.S. Supreme Court has entered this federal-level regulatory 
dialogue through lawsuits attempting to force agency regulation under 
federal environmental statutes and to change corporate behavior directly 
through federal common law.  In the United States, which has struggled 
to develop a coherent federal policy, Massachusetts and AEP powerfully 
shape U.S. federal-level efforts to regulate climate change due to 
Congress’ failure to pass comprehensive climate change legislation, 
which could have supplanted both cases.  This Section explores the ways 
in which AEP builds on Massachusetts to reinforce the current federal 
regulatory pathway. 
The Supreme Court’s approach to climate change litigation in AEP 
flows from its analysis of both threshold and substantive issues in 
Massachusetts.  The most important jurisprudential issues raised in the 
AEP appeal are standing (whether petitioners have the particularized 
interest in the case that allows them to bring the action) and the political 
question doctrine (whether the case raises a nonjusticiable political 
question).  A four justice plurality in AEP found standing based on 
Massachusetts’ reasoning, while four justices opposed standing.17  
Assuming that Justice Sotomayor, who did not participate in AEP 
because she had heard the case while sitting on the Second Circuit, either 
joins the group supporting standing or abstains from the issue—which 
seems far more likely than her joining the group in opposition—AEP 
reinforces that the Court will continue to view governmental petitioners 
                                                 
16 For the Obama administration’s latest efforts on environmental justice, see 
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice and Executive Order 12898, 
Aug. 4, 2011, http://epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/publications/interagency/ 
ej-mou-2011-08.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). For a discussion of potential U.S. approaches 
to climate justice, see Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice 
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008); Alice 
Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 9 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2009). For an analysis of 
climate justice concerns at a global level and possible remedies, see Maxine Burkett, Climate 
Reparations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 509 (2009); Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the 
Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559 (2007). 
17 For analysis of these standing issues, see Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air:  
American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121, 
121–22 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html; Kevin T. Haroff, On 
Thin Air:  Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 46 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 411, 424 (2012). 
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as having the particularized interest necessary to make regulatory 
challenges and thus continue to influence the path of federal regulation. 
However, the plurality’s affirmation of Massachusetts’s approach to 
standing, which focuses heavily on the governmental status of some of 
the petitioners, does not resolve the question of whether it would find 
standing in a suit with only nongovernmental petitioners.  This issue is 
currently being litigated in challenges to projects that have a large carbon 
footprint, such as coal-fired power plants.  Some of these cases involve 
federal law and, in the months following the AEP decision, lower courts 
have split on this issue.  The U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Mexico found that six citizen environmental groups lacked standing in a 
challenge to oil and gas leases based on climate change,18 while the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Colorado held that nongovernmental 
organization, WildEarth Guardians, had standing to challenge leases that 
allow the venting of methane from a coal mine, including on climate 
change grounds.19  Although these district courts’ opinions only have 
precedential weight within their own districts, they will influence the 
ongoing dialogue about whether standing is appropriate in cases 
without governmental petitioners, cases that currently serve as one of the 
few ways in which citizens can attempt to shape the energy choices of 
major corporations. 
In contrast to its explicit language on standing, the Supreme Court’s 
cursory treatment of the political question doctrine challenges provides 
no guidance regarding whether and when such concerns could arise.  
The decisions in the lower courts in AEP and in other climate change 
federal common law public nuisance cases include extensive discussion 
of whether a public nuisance claim would require an initial policy 
determination that would be more appropriate for the political branches 
to make.20  However, the words “political question” do not appear 
explicitly in the Supreme Court’s opinion in AEP.  Four justices held 
“that no other threshold obstacle bars review,” and the other four 
justices, who were opposed to finding standing, did not address 
additional prudential issues, which leaves ambiguity about their position 
on the political question doctrine.21  This lack of analysis of a threshold 
issue at the core of the lower court decisions is curious, but seems 
                                                 
18 Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2011 WL 3924489 (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 
2011).  For examples of similar cases, see Arnold & Porter LLP, Climate Change Litigation in 
the U.S., CLIMATE CASE CHART (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.climatecasechart.com/. 
19 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, Civil Action No. 08-cv-02167-MSK, Oct. 
31, 2011. 
20 James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 127 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/may.html. 
21 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
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unlikely to impact the course of federal statutorily-based regulation 
significantly.  Cases challenging regulatory policy do not involve 
political question problems since they are brought through a statutory 
regime and administrative law; therefore, this issue will continue to 
arise, mostly, in common law challenges not precluded by AEP. 
The core of the AEP decision focuses on the relationship between 
federal regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act and common law 
public nuisance.  The Supreme Court held that “the Clean Air Act and 
the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power 
plants.”22  AEP bases its unanimous displacement decision on 
Massachusetts’s finding that carbon dioxide emissions qualify as air 
pollution under the Clean Air Act.23  AEP interprets that finding as 
establishing Congress’s delegation to the EPA of “whether and how to 
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is 
what displaces federal common law.”24 
In the process of explaining its displacement holding, the Court in 
AEP makes two interrelated points that will shape the path of efforts to 
address climate change at the federal level in the United States.  First, it 
precludes federal common law nuisance actions as a mechanism for 
challenging the EPA’s approach to climate change regulation—even if 
the EPA declines to regulate—so long as the EPA has regulatory 
authority.25  Second, the Court simultaneously reinforces the 
appropriateness of regulatory suits challenging the EPA:  “If the 
plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of the EPA’s 
forthcoming rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek 
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals review, and, ultimately, to petition for certiorari in 
this Court.”26  This combination suggests that the Court remains open to 
climate change litigation’s continuing role in determining the course of 
federal regulation, so long as that litigation has a statutory focus. 
In addition to reinforcing the appropriateness of litigation over 
federal regulatory approaches, AEP puts pressure on Congress to leave 
the current regime under the Clean Air Act in place.  The opinion 
explicitly does not reach whether a federal common law nuisance action 
would be allowed if Congress decided that the EPA could no longer 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  The opinion thus limits federal 
                                                 
22 Id. at 2537. 
23 See Jonathan H. Adler, A Tale of Two Climate Cases, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/adler.html. 
24 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. 
25 Id. at 2539. 
26 Id. 
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common law as a “parallel track” for challenging the EPA’s regulatory 
decisions, but leaves that track potentially open if Congress passes 
legislation that overrides Massachusetts.27 
Finally, AEP continues an ongoing conversation about the role of 
federal courts in assessing climate change science.  Professors Kysar and 
Burkett have raised concerns regarding the Court’s increasing skepticism 
about the science in AEP, especially as compared to the discussion of 
science in Massachusetts.28  This shift parallels the public opinion shift 
described above.  However, AEP does not simply focus on the substance 
of climate science, but also explicitly claims that the EPA is better 
situated than courts to assess climate change science.  The Court explains 
that “[f]ederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological 
resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order” and 
then elaborates on specific mechanisms that agencies have, but courts 
lack.29  This discussion reinforces both Justice Scalia’s statement during 
the Massachusetts oral argument that he is “not a scientist,”30 and the 
Court’s emphasis throughout AEP of the dominance of an agency 
rulemaking, rather than a common law, approach to federal action in this 
area. 
The decision in AEP, then, represents another step in a path that the 
Supreme Court began in Massachusetts.  In the process of focusing in on 
one particular type of action—federal common law public nuisance 
claims that include governmental petitioners—the Court presents a 
vision of its future role as an arbiter of regulatory disputes, rather than as 
a forum for debating climate change science or for directly addressing 
harms to the victims of climate change outside of a legislative 
framework. 
III.  CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF AEP 
These Supreme Court cases represent only a small fraction of the 
cases involving climate change in U.S. courts and other tribunals around 
the world.  Parties have brought cases in state and national courts and 
international tribunals under a wide range of legal theories.  While most 
cases—including Massachusetts—focus on forcing or limiting government 
regulation of major emitters, other cases—such as AEP—attempt to 
                                                 
27 Id. at 2531, 2538. 
28 See Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
115 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html. 
29 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539−40. 
30 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), 2006 
WL 3431932, at *12–13; see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233, 234 (2007). 
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change corporate behavior through tort or rights theories.  As discussed 
in my previous scholarship, these cases impact efforts to regulate climate 
change directly by altering the regulatory landscape both in terms of 
who can regulate and what regulation they engage in, and also more 
indirectly by putting pressure on the government and corporations and 
raising public awareness of the problem.31 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AEP evinces an 
understanding of that broader litigation context by how it frames its 
decision and in what it declines to decide.  It leaves alone most pending 
litigation except for the limited set of cases claiming federal common law 
nuisance, and even then, it indicates that its ruling depends on the 
current context of the EPA’s authority.32  The Court does not decide 
whether state court nuisance cases are preempted and does not even 
mention the many state court regulatory actions regarding coal-fired 
power plants and other carbon-intensive projects (cases well beyond the 
direct scope of AEP).33 
The Court’s view of climate change litigation in AEP ensures that 
courts will remain an important regulatory battleground in the United 
States.  The Court not only endorses the appropriateness of suits over the 
EPA’s approach to regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, 
but also allows this exploding area of litigation to continue—for the most 
part—along its current trajectory.  The increasing investment by law 
firms, governmental entities, and nongovernmental organizations in 
climate change litigation practice likely will proceed apace after AEP.  In 
my view, this aspect of the outcome is good news.  As displayed in 
Massachusetts, AEP, and the myriad of cases before lower courts, 
litigation provides a way for key stakeholders to address conflicts over 
how to move forward.34 
                                                 
31 For an in depth discussion of these dynamics, see Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change 
Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181 & 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 181 
(2007); Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 6; Hari M. Osofsky, The 
Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 3 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky, 
The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:  Implications for Transnational Regulatory 
Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change 
Litigation Part II:  Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573 (2008).  For an 
interesting comparative analysis of U.S. and Australian approaches to climate change 
litigation and of why national-level regulation is also critically important to effective 
mitigation, see Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s Response to 
Global Warming, 24 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 90 (2007).  For an interesting socio-legal analysis of 
the goals and regulatory role of climate change litigation, see Jolene Lin, Climate Change 
and the Courts 4–5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
32 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39. 
33 Lin, supra note 31, at 6. 
34 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  For an opposing view regarding the value 
of climate change litigation in this symposium issue, see Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, 
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However, some of the unanswered questions and closed pathways 
after AEP raise questions about the extent to which citizens will be able 
to use litigation to challenge corporate decision-making and to achieve 
redress for those harmed by climate change.  Professor Burkett argues 
that the Court’s decision to narrow possibilities for federal common law 
nuisance actions raises serious justice concerns because it eliminates an 
option for those injured by climate change to obtain corrective justice 
from major emitters.35  While regulatory suits, if they result in greater 
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, help to constrain the impacts of 
climate change, they provide limited opportunities for victims to obtain 
redress.  Notwithstanding the many procedural and substantive 
concerns about climate change nuisance suits highlighted by Professor 
Gerrard (issues that have not yet been addressed for the most part 
because of the barriers that these cases have faced at early stages),36 these 
suits do focus on the connection between emitters and victims in a way 
that regulatory suits generally do not. 
The decision by the Court to constrain this avenue for potential 
justice has implications for the federal regulatory approach.  Namely, 
unless the Court’s decision in AEP is accompanied by greater assistance 
for climate change victims in the regulatory framework, its emphasis on 
the agency pathway risks exacerbating the climate justice problem by 
providing fewer ways for victims to obtain redress.  But addressing 
climate justice within a federal regulatory framework, even assuming 
there is adequate political support for such an approach, raises a host of 
complex concerns.  To the extent that climate justice involves helping 
people with few resources adapt to climate change, the federal 
adaptation program in collaboration with smaller scale adaptation efforts 
provides relatively uncontroversial mechanisms for addressing 
inequality.37 
However, if a vision of climate justice also includes compensation for 
harm that goes beyond adaptation assistance (e.g., the Inuit being unable 
                                                                                                             
and Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 400–01 (2012).  
35 See Burkett, supra note 28. 
36 See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html. 
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to use their ancestral lands in line with their traditional practices),38 
integrating such compensation into a regulatory scheme, particularly if it 
includes a corrective justice component of funding or other assistance 
from major emitters,39 will likely be far more complex and politically 
contentious.  As litigation continues to shape the federal regulatory path, 
important questions remain about how to help those most vulnerable to 
climate change through domestic law.  Major emitters’ choices are 
intertwined with those of climate change victims, but these linkages are 
hard to address directly through either mitigation or adaptation 
programs.  Whether courts or legislatures create a regulatory framework 
for climate change, the United States needs to find better ways to address 
these fundamental fairness concerns. 
                                                 
38 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  U.S. and Canadian Inuit filed a petition 
with the Inter-American Commission, which was rejected, claiming that U.S. climate 
change policy violated their rights.  See Letter from the Org. of Am. States to Sheila Watt-
Cloutier, et al. regarding Petition No. P–1413–05, (Feb. 1, 2007) (on file with the author); 
Letter from the Org. of Am. States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al. regarding Petition No. P–
1413–05 (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the author); Letter from Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Martin 
Wagner, and Daniel Magraw to Santiago Cantón, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-American Comm’n on 
Human Rights (Jan. 15, 2007) (on file with the author); see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit 
Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007); Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Presentation at the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference Eleventh Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Montreal, (Dec. 7, 2005), www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID= 
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